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TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OwN HANDS: RETALIATORY
ACTIONS BY COWORKERS AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S
NARROW STANDARD FOR EMPLOYER LIABILITY
Elizabeth A. Cramer*
I. INTRODUCTION

Bullying has become an increasingly popular social issue in recent
years. The public typically focuses on bullying between adolescents in
schools, but what happens when bullies become adults and bullying
occurs in the workplace? Workplace harassment, and the retaliation
that may stem from reporting improper behavior, comes in frightening
forms. Employees such as Cherri Hill, who report discrimination to
their employers internally, often witness the devastating ramifications
of their actions. In Hill's case, her car was set on fire just a few weeks
after reporting claims of sexual harassment to her employer.' Left with
few options, Hill and three of her coworkers who experienced the same
harassment eventually brought suit against their employer, AnheuserBusch, for claims of sex discrimination and coworker retaliation.2
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of Anheuser-Busch's motion for summary judgment on
Hill's sexual discrimination and retaliation claims.3 The likelihood of
success for Hill's retaliation claim could have been greatly diminished
if her case was tried in another jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit, for
example, imposes a much higher burden on plaintiffs in coworker
retaliation claims than the Sixth Circuit. This high standard was
pronounced in the Fifth Circuit's recent decision, Hernandez v. Yellow
Transportation, Inc.4 This Casenote addresses how the Hernandez
decision departs from Supreme Court precedent, and other circuit
courts, and makes it more difficult for employees to find protection
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
* I would like to thank Professor Sandra F. Sperino and Professor Ann Hubbard for their
invaluable guidance on my Casenote. I would also like to thank my loved ones for their unwavering
support throughout my entire educational career.
1. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 329 (6th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 331. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio based on diversity jurisdiction. Id.
3. Id. at 349. The remaining plaintiffs, Hawkins, Cunningham, and Jackson were somewhat
less successful. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Anheuser-Busch on
Hawkins's sexual harassment claim and Jackson's coworker retaliation claim. Id. at 344, 349. The
court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer for Cunningham's sexual
harassment claim. Id. at 342.
4. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2012).
5. 42 U.S.C. §2000e (2006).
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Part II of this Casenote provides background information on Title
VII § 704(a), known as the "antiretaliation" provision. 6 Part II also
introduces the various standards used by U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals in determining employer liability for coworker retaliation.
Part III outlines the Fifth Circuit decision of Hernandez v. Yellow
Transportation, Inc. Part IV discusses why the Fifth Circuit's
coworker retaliation standard and resulting holding in Hernandez
conflicts with precedent established by the Supreme Court, and how
legal and public policy reasoning undermines the Fifth Circuit's
standard and holding. Part IV also advocates for the use of a broad
negligence standard for coworker retaliation as applied by the majority
of federal appellate courts. The Casenote will conclude that only a
negligence standard can successfully deter and remedy coworker
retaliation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to § 704(a) of Title VI
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted "to eliminate,
through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures,
discrimination in employment ..

."7

It protects individuals on the

basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 8
The
antiretaliation provision of Title VII is codified in § 704(a).9 A
primary purpose of § 704(a) is to grant employees "unfettered access
to statutory remedial mechanisms." 10 In addition, the provision is
meant to prevent employers from inhibiting employees' efforts to
either secure or advance the enforcement of Title VII's protections
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
7. H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401. The legislative
history regarding § 704(a) has been less helpful. In fact, commentators have described its legislative
history to provide "little interpretive guidance" or "little insight" to the purpose of the antiretaliation
provision specifically. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 375, 386 (2010); Patricia A. Moore, Parting is Such Sweet Sorrow: The Application of
Title VII to Post-Employment Retaliation, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 205, 211 (1993).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
9. The section states, "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including
on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to
discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
10. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
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through the use of retaliation." Thus, § 704(a) "prevents harm to
individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct."l2
Section 704(a) advances these objectives by offering two types of
enforceable rights to job applicants, current employees, and former
employees.' 3 First, § 704(a) protects those who oppose employer
practices that are deemed unlawful under Title VII.1 Opposition to
unlawful employer practices includes activities such as refusal to
perform a supervisor's order to engage in discriminatory conduct.15
Second, it protects those who participate in Title VII proceedings.' 6
Participation includes activities such as making a charge of employers'
violations or assisting in an investigation of alleged discrimination. 17
These dual protections are often referred to as the "opposition" clause
and the "participation" clause.' 8
In order for individuals, or potential claimants, to bring claims under
§ 704(a) they must first file a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).19 The EEOC is the federal
administrative agency responsible for the enforcement of Title VII's
provisions. 20 To enforce Title VII, the EEOC first serves a notice upon
the charged party, and then begins to investigate the charge. 2 ' Upon
the conclusion of the investigation, the EEOC decides whether
reasonable cause exists to believe that the claims within the charge are
true.22 If the agency determines reasonable cause exists to believe the
claims, it then attempts to resolve the charge through settlement
processes with the charged employer.23 If the EEOC does not find
reasonable cause to the claims, it dismisses the charge and notifies the
11. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
12. Id.
13. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 339, 346.
14. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 56.
15. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 277
(2009).
16. See BurlingtonN., 548 U.S. at 56.
17. See id.
18. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC Compliance Manual: Section
8-I(A), (1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html [hereinafter EEOC Compliance Manual].
19. 42 U.S.C. app. § 2000e-5 (2006).
20. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
21. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
22. Id. When determining the reasonable cause inquiry, "the Commission shall accord
substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings
commenced under State or local law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and (d) of this
section." Id. The EEOC must make its determination within the statutory time limits found in
§ 706(b}-(d). Id. § 2000e-5(a).
23. Id. § 2000e-5(b). If settlement attempts are unsuccessful, the EEOC decides whether to file a
lawsuit against the employer. If the EEOC determines not to file a lawsuit itself, it will issue a Notice of
Right to Sue to the claimant. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
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claimant by issuance of a "Notice of Right to Sue." 24 This notice gives
the claimant permission to file suit against the employer in court. 25
Though receiving a notice means the EEOC did not find reasonable
cause to the claims in the charge, these notices do not have any
precedential value in future litigation.
Individuals who choose to file retaliation claims in federal court
must be able to prove a prima facie case of retaliation. To prove a
prima facie case, a plaintiff must show: (1) the employee was engaged
in a protected activity, either opposition or participation; (2) the
employer took a materially adverse employment action against the
employee; and (3) a causal connection between the adverse
employment action and protected activity. 2 6 Federal courts were
divided on what constituted an "adverse employment action" prior to
the Supreme Court's Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.

White decision.2 7 Some federal circuits required the action to be an
"ultimate employment decision." 28 Others required actions that altered
the "'terms, conditions, or benefits' of employment." 29 Still other courts
required actions to "have been material to a reasonable employee," 30 or
"based on a retaliatory motive and [reasonably] likely to deter the
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity." 31
The Supreme Court resolved the various interpretations of "adverse
employment action" in Burlington Northern, and held that the scope of
§ 704(a) is not limited to discriminatory employment actions that affect
the terms or conditions of employment. 32 Instead, employers are liable
for materially adverse employment actions that would discourage a
reasonable employee from filing or supporting a discrimination
claim.

24. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The notice is also often called a "right to sue" letter.
25. Id. Individuals have ninety days to file suit. Id.
26. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901-02 (D.D.C. 2006). In University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the U.S. Supreme Court held that necessary proof of causation
for a Title VII retaliation claim is "but-for" causation (i.e. employer's desire to retaliate was the but-for
cause of the materially adverse employment action). 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
27. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006).
28. Id. at 60 (brackets omitted). Some federal courts, including the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, interpret ultimate employment actions to include "hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, and compensating." Id (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,
707 (5th Cir. 1997)).
29. Id. at 60 (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)).
30. Id. (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)). Both
the Seventh Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit apply this standard.
31. Id. at 61 (quoting Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000)). The EEOC
has also noted this standard in its guidance materials.
32. Id. at 63.
33. Id. at 68.
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The Court supported its broad interpretation of § 704(a) with two
reasons: the plain text of the statute and the need to give the provision
actual power. 3 4 First, the Court noted that § 704(a) lacks reference to
"status as an employee" or "employment opportunities" in the way that
§ 703, Title VII's antidiscrimination provision, incorporates the terms
of "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."35
Second, the broad interpretation was necessary due to the realities that
successful retaliation can occur by taking harmful actions outside of
the workplace, or taking actions only indirectly related to
employment.36 The Court noted examples of effective retaliation
occurring outside the workplace, such as an employer not following its
own policy of investigating death threats against workers, and another
employer who filed false criminal charges against an employee.3 7
Such findings, according to the Court, showed that § 704(a) would not
be able to deter all effective forms of retaliation without a broad
interpretation. 38
The Supreme Court then supported its use of an objective standard
because retaliatory actions could be "immaterial in some situations"
yet "material in others." 39 The objective standard was also deemed
necessary because it could be judicially administered and also avoids
the potential uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that would arise if a
subjective standard was applied by the federal courts. 40
B. The FederalCircuit Courts' Opposing Standardsfor Coworker
Retaliation

Federal courts have continued to apply varying standards in the
context of employer liability for coworker retaliation despite the
Supreme Court's guidance in its Burlington Northern decision. The
Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Hernandez v. Yellow Transportation,
34. Id. at 61-63.
35. Id. at 62; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The entire section states, "it shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
36. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63.
37. Id. at 64.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 69.
40. This objective standard has been utilized in other Title VII contexts as well, such as
constructive discharge and hostile work environment claims. Id. at 68-69.
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Inc. 41 has widened the differences in the circuit courts' standards.
The following Subpart will outline the standards applied by the
Court of Appeals for the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits. These standards may be grouped by those requiring: (1)
employers to have known or should have known of the coworkers'
retaliatory actions, the broadest standard; (2) employers to have actual
knowledge of the coworkers' retaliatory actions, the intermediate
standard; or (3) the retaliation to be in furtherance of the employer's
business without any element of the employer's knowledge, the
narrowest standard.
The majority of federal appellate courts utilize the broadest
standard, which is based on the employers' negligence.42 The First,
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have all applied this standard with
minor variants. The First Circuit requires that the employer knew, or
should have known, about coworkers creating hostile work
environments, but failed to stop such harassment.43 Coworkers may
create a hostile work environment when workplace harassment is
sufficiently severe or persuasive."

The Second Circuit also follows the broad standard, holding that
employers are liable for coworker retaliation if the employer knew of
the coworker's actions and did not take any action in response, or
failed to provide a reasonable avenue for the original complaint.4 5
Similarly, the Third Circuit finds employers liable for coworker
retaliation when supervisors "'knew or should have known about the
[coworker] harassment, but failed to take prompt and adequate
remedial action' to stop the abuse."46
The Sixth Circuit applies a negligence standard as well, though it
has elaborated on its requirements with a more detailed list of
elements. The court has ruled that employers are liable for coworker
retaliation when the conduct is so sufficiently severe that it would
dissuade a reasonable employee from either making or supporting

discrimination claims, the supervisors or management have either
actual or constructive knowledge of the retaliatory behavior,47 and the

41. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 644-61 (5th Cir. 2012).
42. Federal courts also utilize negligence standards for coworker harassment falling within the
scope of Title VII's § 703(a) antidiscrimination provision. E.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d
76, 95 (1st Cir. 2005).
43. Id. . 94.
44. Id at 89.
45. Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1180 (2d Cir. 1996).
46. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F. 3d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 2006).
47. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 347 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit uses
the language of "constructive knowledge" without further elaboration and appears to use constructive
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supervisors or management condoned, encouraged, or tolerated the
retaliation, or responded to the plaintiffs complaints in an inadequate
manner that manifests either indifference or unreasonableness.4 8
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits employ the intermediate standard,
which requires employers to have actual knowledge of coworkers'
retaliatory actions. The Seventh Circuit imposes employer liability if
the employers were aware of the retaliation and did not correct the
conduct. 49 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit holds employers liable "where
its supervisory or management personnel either orchestrate[d] the
harassment or kn[e]w about the harassment and acquiesce[d] in it in
such a manner as to condone and encourage the co-workers' actions." 50
The Fifth Circuit uses the narrowest standard applied by any of the
circuit courts. The court requires coworker retaliatory actions to be
committed "in furtherance of the employer's business" in order for
plaintiffs to meet the materially adverse employment action
requirement of a prima facie case of retaliation, which may then later
be rebutted by the employer.5' Actions are only made in furtherance of
the business when a direct, and not simply indirect, relationship exists
between the retaliatory actions and the busineSS. 52 The Fifth Circuit
recently applied this narrow standard in Hernandez v. Yellow
Transportation,Inc.53
III. HERNANDEZ V. YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC.

The following Part first discusses the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas's decision in Arrieta v. Yellow
Transportation, Inc. The Part then discusses the Fifth Circuit's
decision on appeal.
A. The District Court's Decision

Before reaching the Fifth Circuit, the Hernandez plaintiffs brought
their claims before the United States District Court for the Northern

knowledge as knowledge that parties should have known. This note takes no position on whether
constructive knowledge and knowledge the employer should have known are distinguished.
48. Id.
49. Knox v. State of Ind., 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
50. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F. 3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998). The court
further elaborated that management cannot orchestrate, condone, or encourage the retaliatory actions
unless management has actual knowledge. Id.
51. Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F. 3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996).
52. Id.
53. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 644-61 (5th Cir. 2012).
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District of Texas in Arrieta v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. 54 The
Arrieta lawsuit involved seven current and former employees at
These
Yellow Transportation, Inc.'s (YTI) Dallas Terminal. 1
racial
including
employees brought claims of Title VII violations
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation for
opposition to discriminatory practices."
The employees alleged numerous actions taken by coworkers
against minority employees. The allegations included: a hangman's
noose being hung on a dock where the majority of minority employees
worked,5 7 racial slurs being spoken and appearing on bathroom walls, 58
firecrackers being thrown at the minority employees, 59 and the tires of
minority employees' personal vehicles being slashed while on
company property. 60
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of YTI on
each of the plaintiffs' retaliation claims. 61 The court applied a
modified McDonnell-Douglas framework,6 2 which requires plaintiffs
to first prove a prima facie case of retaliation. Subsequently, the
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged retaliation. 63 Then, if the
employer is able to meet its burden of production, the burden again
shifts back to plaintiffs to show evidence that would allow a reasonable
jury to conclude the adverse employment action would not have
transpired but for the plaintiffs' protected activity. 64
When considering each of the retaliation claims within the modified
McDonnell-Douglas framework, the district court found that all of the
plaintiffs met the first element to prove a prima facie case of retaliation
by participating in the protected activity of picketing outside of an YTI

54. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 12, 2008), rev'dsub nom. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2012).
55. Arrieta, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1; Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 649. Each of the plaintiffs were
also members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and thus, the Yellow Transp., Inc. and
Teamster's collective bargaining agreement governed the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs'
employment. Id.
56. Arrieta,2008 WL 5220569, at *1.
57. Original Complaint at 8, Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 2008 WL 5220569 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
12, 2008) (No. 3:05-CV-2271-D), 2005 WL 3625216.
58. Id. at 9.
59. Id. at 16.
60. Id. at 29. The plaintiffs also alleged supervisors granted white employees more favorable
assignments, break times, and lunch times than minority employees. Id. at 60.
61. Arrieta, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1.
62. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
63. Arrieta, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1, 16-17.
64. Id. at *17.
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Dallas terminal. 65 However, the plaintiffs' claims ultimately failed
when the district court held that the alleged materially adverse
employment action was not made in furtherance of the employer's

business. 66
B. The Court ofAppealsfor the Fifth Circuit'sDecision
In response to the district court's ruling, the plaintiffs first moved

for reconsideration by the district court, but the motion was denied.
Then, three of the plaintiffs, Rubin Hernandez, John Ketterer, and

Abram Trevino, appealed the district court's decision; however, only
Ketterer's appeal was based on coworker retaliation.6 8
John Ketterer, a Caucasian, was a dockworker for YTI at the time of
the suit.6 9 As a basis for his retaliation claim, Ketterer asserted
participation in a protected activity when he picketed the YTI's Dallas
terminal. 70 He then alleged coworkers harassed him due to his
picketing.7' The coworker harassment included physical intimidation,
vandalism of his property, verbal threats, name calling, and observing
violence and illegal behavior.72 Ketterer's appeal of his retaliation
claim focused on first, whether he suffered adverse employment
action, and second, whether the action would have been taken but for
his participation in a protected activity.73
The Fifth Circuit elaborated on the requirements of a prima facie
case and held that the determination of whether an adverse
employment action has occurred is dependent on the identity of the
final decision maker.74 Actions of ordinary employees, due to their
lack of decision-making power, could therefore not be imputable to
employers unless the employee actions were conducted "in the
65. Id.at*18.
66. Id. at *1. The district court also concluded that some of the plaintiffs could not meet the
third requirement of showing a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action. Id at *19-22.
67. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2009 WL 129731, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 20, 2009).
68. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 2012). Abram Trevino,
however, did file a retaliation claim before the district court. The district court granted Yellow
Transportation, Inc. summary judgment on Trevino's retaliation claims. Arriela, 2008 WL 5220569, at
*23.
69. Hernandez,670 F.3d at 650.
70. Id at 657.
71. Id. at 657-58. Ketterer also alleged adverse material action due to supervisors assigning him
an increased and unfavorable workload and reinstating him without backpay. Id
72. Id at 657.
73. Id.
74. Id
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furtherance of the employer's business."75 The court continued to hold
that only a showing of a direct connection between the employer's
business and the alleged conduct would suffice. 76
When applying this coworker retaliation standard to Ketterer's
claims, the court found he was unable to meet the adverse employment
action requirement. First, the court found that any alleged harassment
was made by ordinary employees and was not in furtherance of YTI's
business.77 Next, Ketterer could not prove a causal link between his
protected activity and an increase in less favorable work assignments.7 8
Finally, reinstatement without pay could not prove retaliation because
YTI offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, and
Ketterer could not rebut this reason by offering but for causation
between his protected activity and the employment decision. 79 The
Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment on Ketterer's retaliation claim.so
IV. THE

WEAKNESSES OF THE "IN FURTHERANCE" STANDARD

The Fifth Circuit standard for coworker retaliation in its Hernandez
decision is problematic for a variety of reasons. First, the "in
furtherance of the business" standard departs from Supreme Court
precedent. Second, the standard dismisses other legal justifications
that support the application of a broad negligence standard for
coworker retaliation. Third, the Fifth Circuit's standard ignores public
policy concerns that expose its weaknesses. The following Part will
elaborate on these significant issues.
A. The Fifth Circuit'sDeparturefrom Supreme Court Precedent
The most troublesome aspect of the Fifth Circuit's standard is that it
fails to align with the Supreme Court's holdings. As previously
mentioned within Part II of the Casenote, the Supreme Court has held
that "the scope of [§ 704(a) of Title VII] extends beyond workplace-

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Ketterer urged the court to abandon its "in furtherance of the employer's business"
framework and replace it with a standard that holds employers liable for their inaction to respond to
coworker retaliation when the employers have actual knowledge of the retaliatory actions. Id. The
court responded that, "[tihis Court adheres strictly to the maxim that one panel of the court cannot
overturn another, even if it disagrees with the prior panel's holding." Id. at 658.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm." 8' The Court
has also held that actionable retaliation is not limited to "ultimate
employment decisions." 8 2 These holdings have been clearly justified
and expanded upon by the Court.
The Court has reasoned that § 704(a) does not include any language
referring to either employee status or opportunities.8 3 In addition, it
has acknowledged that because retaliatory actions are diverse in form,
§ 704(a) must be broad enough to provide a deterrent effect. 84 The
Court has also emphasized that the two main objectives of § 704(a) are
to protect those who have been retaliated against by giving them access
to remedial measures and to avoid future harm.85 Out of these
purposes, the Court has held the primary objective of Title VII's
provisions is to avoid harm. 86 By limiting employer liability for
coworker retaliation to only those times when the retaliation is
employment-related and in furtherance of the business, the Fifth
Circuit contradicts the Court's broad interpretation of retaliation claims
under Title VII.
B. Legal Justificationsfor the Application of a Negligence Standard

Additional legal rationale supports the application of a negligence
standard for coworker retaliation, thus undermining the Fifth Circuit's
narrow standard. The use of a negligence standard in other Title VII
causes of action show the feasibility of its application in coworker
retaliation cases. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's narrow standard fails
to recognize the reality that coworker retaliation can be a materially
adverse action, which causes employees to reconsider their decision to
81. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 62; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The entire section states, "it shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
84. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 64.
85. "Although Title VII seeks 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination,' its 'primary objective,' like that of any statute meant to influence
primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 805-06 (1998) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
86. Id. Individuals may also fail to report unethical actions like discrimination in the workplace
because they will be less likely to be promoted or receive letters of recommendation. Reasons may
also include fear that a "reporting" reputation may extend outside of the particular employer
internally. KIPLING D. WILLIAMS, OSTRACISM: THE POWER OF SILENCE 193 (2006).
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make or support a charge of discrimination against their employers.
1. A Broad Negligence Standard Is Used in Other Title VII Causes of
Action
The Supreme Court has departed from the notion that employers are
only liable for actions within the scope of employment, or actions
made with some intent to aid the employer.87 Accordingly, many
federal courts have applied a negligence standard to Title VII
violations involving the actions of coworkers. The use of a negligence
standard in these contexts shows that a broad negligence standard is a
reasonable and effective way to adjudicate coworker retaliation
claims.8 8
Different types of harassment, especially sexual harassment, fall
outside the scope of employment, but courts still impose liability on
negligent employers in these types of claims. 89 As an example, courts
have used a negligence standard for employer liability regarding
coworker harassment. The Seventh Circuit has held that employers
may be liable if they knew, or should have known, about the harassing

acts, but failed to take adequate remedial measures. 90 Even the Fifth
Circuit looks to whether the employer knew, or should have known, of
the coworker harassment, yet failed to take prompt corrective action.9 1

87. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-57 (1998).
88. See generally Anicus Curiae Brief of Employment Law Professors in Support of Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, Ketterer v. Yellow Transp., Inc., (2012) (No. 11-1361), 2012 WL 2109660
[hereinafter Brief for Ketterer].
89. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court held, "The general rule is that sexual harassment by a
supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment." It continued to hold, "in limited
circumstances, agency principles impose liability on employers even where employees commit torts
outside the scope of employment. The principles are set forth in the much-cited § 219(2) of the
Restatement." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757-58. The Court recently acknowledged that employers can be
held liable for harassment occurring outside of the scope of employment because § 219(2)(d) provides
an exception that servants (or employees) can be "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation." Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
90. McKenzie v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Vance, 133
S.Ct. at 2451 ("Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, this approach will not leave employees
unprotected against harassment by co-workers who possess the authority to inflict psychological injury
by assigning unpleasant tasks or by altering the work environment in objectionable ways. In such cases,
the victims will be able to prevail simply by showing that the employer was negligent in permitting this
harassment to occur, and the jury should be instructed that the nature and degree of authority wielded by
the harasser is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the employer was
negligent.") (internal references omitted).
91. This "negligence" standard is one of the four elements used to determine whether coworker
harassment constitutes a hostile work environment. The other factors required include: (1) the employee
is member of a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwanted harassment; (3) the
harassment was based on the protected trait; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege
of employment. Harvill v. Westward Commc'ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428,434 (5th Cir. 2005).
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The similarities between harassment and retaliation support the
application of negligence standards for both coworker harassment and
coworker retaliation.
Retaliation and harassment are closely intertwined in an obvious
way. Retaliatory actions often include diverse types of harassment
when the harassment occurs after assertions of Title VII protection
have been made. In addition, concerns of potential retaliation also
affect the way individuals react to harassment.92 The EEOC's
interpretation of retaliatory actions further supports a claim of
relatedness between retaliation and harassment. The EEOC website
states that it is "illegal to fire, demote, harass, or otherwise 'retaliate'
against people (applicants or employees)" because the employees
opposed the employer's actions or participated in Title VII
proceedings. 93 This interrelatedness leads to a reasonable conclusion
that both coworker harassment and coworker retaliation should be held
to a similar standard in which employers are liable for their negligence.
2. The Fifth Circuit's Narrow Standard is Contrary to the Concept of
"Materially Adverse Action"
The Fifth Circuit's narrow standard infers coworker retaliation could
never be materially adverse, and thus never dissuade reasonable
employees from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. This
conclusion assumes that only supervisor retaliation could dissuade
reasonable employees from opposing unlawful employer practices or
participating in Title VII proceedings. Such logic is erroneous. As
stated by Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, "[a] co-worker can
break a co-worker's arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has
regular contact with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by
his or her offensive conduct." 94
Though coworkers cannot control employment conditions such as the
assignment of tasks, coworkers can dramatically alter the ability of other
employees to perform their duties efficiently. Case law reveals that
employees have been faced with coworkers hiding their time cards,
slashing their vehicles' tires, or even setting their vehicles on fire.
These types of retaliatory actions would severely affect employees'

92. Eisha Jain, Realizing the Potentialof the JointHarassment/RetaliationClaim, 117 YALE L.J.
120, 124 (2007).
93. Retaliation, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfin (emphasis added).
94. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (citing Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Henson
v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring)).
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ability to perform their work. These retaliatory actions would also likely
dissuade reasonable employees from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination due to fear that further retaliation would occur. These
realities show the vast problems with the "in furtherance" standard
applied by the Fifth Circuit in its Hernandez decision.
3. Coworker Retaliation Can Be Related to Employers' Businesses
One argument against the application of a negligence standard for
coworker retaliation is that such retaliatory acts are too unrelated to the
employer's business to impose employer liability.9 5 The Fifth Circuit
has held that coworker recommendations to discharge a peer are outside
the scope of "in furtherance of the business" because coworkers have no
control over their peer's employment status.96
If coworker
recommendations regarding management and the future workforce of
the business are outside the scope of the "in furtherance standard," one
has difficulty imagining what actions would satisfy this standard.
Perhaps this is why neither the Hernandez decision, nor the Fifth
Circuit's previous decisions cited in the opinion, 97 reveal any examples
of when employers could be liable for coworker retaliation.
Retaliatory acts by coworkers can arguably be closely related to the
employer's business. As stated by the Supreme Court in dicta, "in a
sense, most workplace tortfeasors, whether supervisors or co-workers,
are aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the employment
relation: Proximity and regular contact afford a captive pool of potential
victims."9 8 Moreover, employees could commit retaliatory actions
against coworkers for the purpose of aiding the employer, especially
management. Employees may believe retaliating against coworkers will
stifle employees' willingness to make complaints against the employer
and to demand remedial action that would dramatically alter workplace
customs. In addition, the retaliating employees may believe their
actions will benefit other low-level employees by giving the employees
more freedom in their workplace conduct. As a result of these potential
beliefs, coworkers taking matters into their own hands could allow the
employer to more easily avoid addressing and remedying workplace
complaints. While not all coworker retaliation is committed to benefit
the employer, the possibility of it shows that a negligence standard is a
fair method to determine employer liability.
95. See Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F. 3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996).
96. Id
97. E.g., id.
98. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 744. The Court continued to say that the aided in the employment
relation principle does require something in addition to the relation itself. Id
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C. PublicPolicy Justificationsfor the Application ofa Negligence
Standard
In addition to legal reasoning, prominent public policy reasons
advocate for broad employer liability in the context of coworker
retaliation. These public policy reasons include the potential chilling
effect stemming from the Fifth Circuit's standard, the difficulty in
determining supervisors from coworkers, the rising prevalence of
workplace retaliation, the standard's discouragement of proper
employer supervision, and the benefits employers receive by
proactively responding to coworker retaliation.
1. The Fifth Circuit's Standard Has a Potentially Great Chilling Effect
Both the federal courts and the EEOC have been concerned with the
chilling effect facing potential Title VII plaintiffs.99 The Supreme
Court in particular has reiterated that the main reason why
discrimination or bias goes unreported is due to fear of retaliation.100
In fact, the Court previously stated, "Title VII depends for its
enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who are willing to file
complaints and act as witnesses." 0 1
Despite these realizations, cases such as Hernandez demonstrate that
employees still have reason to fear retaliation from supervisors as well
as coworkers. Even if employees can overcome this fear, the social
and economic costs of internal reporting, filing an EEOC charge, and
bringing a lawsuit are extreme. Employees who file charges must
endure months of discomfort at work and uncertainty regarding their
future employment, all while wondering whether their complaints will,
or can be, adequately remedied. If employees bring suit against their
employer, then the employees must prepare to battle with employers
who have more resources to litigate the suit. The obstacles facing such
employees are even further exacerbated when considering the low
likelihood of the employees receiving a judicially imposed remedy,
especially in a jurisdiction that adopts a narrow standard such as the
Fifth Circuit. 102
99. The EEOC also stated, "[i]f retaliation for such activities were permitted to go unremedied, it
would have a chilling effect upon the willingness of individuals to speak out against employment
discrimination or to participate in the EEOC's administrative process or other employment
discrimination proceedings." EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 18, at A.
100. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cnty, Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009)
(quoting Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 20 (2005)); see also Brake, supra, at 37,
n. 58 (compiling studies).
101. Burlington N. &Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
102. Some of these social costs include being viewed as disloyal to the employer, or as an
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2. Determining Supervisors from Coworkers Can Be Challenging
Applying a narrow standard for coworker retaliation is problematic
because clear distinctions between coworkers and supervisors are not
present in all workplaces. Title VII does not offer any guidance on this
issue, as the statute is devoid of a definition for "supervisors." In
response, up until very recently the federal courts have been left to use
various definitions for supervisors in the scope of employment law.
The Seventh Circuit utilized a narrow definition, holding that
supervisors are those who have the authority to directly affect the terms
and conditions of an individual's employment. 03 Such direct authority
"primarily consists of the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer,
or discipline an employee."' 04 Actions such as overseeing aspects of
another employee's performance are therefore too weak to establish a
supervisory position under this standard.'
In contrast, the Second Circuit adopted a much broader definition of
supervisors. The court held that supervisors are those who possess
"authority given by the employer to the employee [that] enabled or
materially augmented the ability of the latter to create a hostile work
environment" for the subordinate employee.1 06 The EEOC also
followed this broad definition of supervisor, stating that employees
serve as supervisors when "(a) the individual has authority to undertake
or recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the employee;
or (b) [t]he individual has authority to direct the employee's daily work
activities."' 07
The Supreme Court recently resolved the circuit split regarding the
definition of "supervisors" in Vance v. Ball State University,0 8 a 5-4
decision. The Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's narrow
outsider. Professor Deborah L. Brake has elaborated on the challenges with reporting and states,
"[fJirst, retaliation operates against a backdrop of widespread reluctance to acknowledge and report
discrimination. This reluctance reflects an acute understanding of the social costs of identifying and
challenging discrimination. Second, persons who challenge discrimination are often disliked by the
beneficiaries of the social structure. This dislike creates prime conditions for retaliation." Brake, supra
note 100, at 25. Economic costs may involve the employee's job security, salary, the chance for
promotions, or the ability to receive positive references from the employer. See Brief for Ketterer,
supra note 88, at *12.
103. Rhodes v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 506 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Parkins v. Civil
Constructors of Ill., Inc. 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998)).
104. Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1034.
105. Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 506.
106. Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogatedby Vance v. Ball
State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).
107. Mack, 326 F.3d at 127 (quoting EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer
Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7654 (1999) (emphasis in
original)).
108. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2434. The Court decided the case on June 24, 2013.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss2/10

16

Cramer: Taking Matters Into Their Own Hands: Retaliatory Actions by Cowor

2013]1

TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OwN HANDS

607

definition and held that "for purposes of vicarious liability under Title
VII" employees are supervisors "if [they are] empowered by the
employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to
effect a 'significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits." 09 The Court supported its decisions with the Ellerth and
Faragherholdings, which "presuppose[s] a clear distinction between
supervisors and co-workers" by holding that only supervisors can cause
direct economic harm.110 The Court stated the Ellerth/Faragher
framework allows supervisory status to be "readily determined" and the
Seventh Circuit's understanding of this principle "can be applied
without undue difficulty at both the summary judgment stage and at
trial."' 1 ' The Supreme Court then noted its belief that "the approach
recommended by the EEOC Guidance ... would make the
determination of supervisor status depend on a highly case-specific
evaluation of numerous factors."' 12
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the dissenting Justices,113
advocated for courts to use the EEOC's definition of supervisors, which
allows supervisory status to be established by an employee's power to
direct another employee's daily activities.114
Justice Ginsberg
contrasted this approach with the majority's, stating that the Court's
narrow definition of supervisors "diminishes the force of Faragherand
Ellerth, ignores the conditions under which members of the work force
labor, and disserves the objective of Title VII to prevent discrimination
from infecting the Nation's workplaces." 15
Though the Court's recently established definition of supervisors is
meant to be "workable," the lower courts may still have difficulty in
determining whether employees are supervisors or coworkers. As
Justice Ginsburg noted, ambiguity remains as to what constitutes
"significantly different responsibilities" for job reassignments.'
in
addition, the Court did not provide a definition for "significant
change[s] in benefits," thus leaving the lower courts to interpret its
meaning.' 17 Finally, the Court does not provide guidance on how the
109. Id. at 2443.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2443-44.
112. Id.
113. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg in dissenting from the
majority opinion. Id. at 2454.
114. Id. at 2455.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2462.
117. Id. at 2444.
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courts should consider situations in which employment action is taken
based on information or recommendations from employees who do not
have the authority to take tangible employment action, yet are the true
cause behind the tangible employment action. The lower courts may
find different answers to these unanswered issues, and thus employer
liability may remain somewhat unpredictable even after Vance.
3. Workplace Retaliation Is Increasing
The Fifth Circuit's narrow standard can also be undermined by the
EEOC's statistical findings and other studies regarding retaliation in
the workplace. These findings reveal a prevalence of retaliation,
including retaliation by coworkers, and its substantially harmful
effects. EEOC statistics from 1997 to 2012 reveal that retaliation
claims have reached their height in recent years."'
The EEOC
received 14,814 more Title VII retaliation claims in 2012 than 1997."9
Title VII claims made by federal employees in 2011 alone show that
"the basis most frequently alleged was reprisal/retaliation" and "the
issue most frequently alleged was non-sexual harassment." 20 The
EEOC reports these findings as a consistent trend for the past five fiscal
years. 121
Other studies also expose the increasing trend of workplace
retaliation. The Ethics Resources Center (ERC) has reported that
physical harm against both employees' person and property are on the
rise. 122 The ERC reports physical harm growing an alarming 27% in
just two years.123 The ERC also published findings regarding
Employees
retaliatory actions committed solely by coworkers.
reported retaliation in the form of the coworkers giving the cold
shoulder, or ignoring the employees, at a rate of about 60%.124 In
addition, reports of retaliation in the form of verbal abuse from
coworkers rose 9% between 2009 and 2011.125
Furthermore, a study by NAVEX Global, a global ethics and
118. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, (2012), http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfin.
119. The EEOC received 16,394 claims in 1997 and received 31,208 in 2012. Id.
120. U. S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS,

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE FEDERAL WORK FORCE PART I EEOC COMPLAINTS PROCESSING, I-11 (2011).
121. Id.
122. ETHics RESOURCE CENTER, 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: WORKPLACE

ETHICS INTRANSITION 16 (2012), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/FinalNBES-web.pdf.
123. Instances of physical harm were reported at 4% in 2009 and 31% in 2011. Id.
124. The statistics reveal this form of retaliation was reported at a rate of 60% in 2009 and 62% in
2011. Id.
125. Id.
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compliance intelligence consultant, found that employees have
increasingly categorized retaliation as harm that is specifically
committed by coworkers. 126 The company also found that employees
often define retaliation in the form of negative comments made by
coworkers.1 27 Similar reports by other groups have noted that social
ostracism of whistleblowing employees is a more common retaliatory
technique than adverse employment action.128
These studies show retaliation has been an increasingly significant
issue for employees. Even with statutory protections like Title VII,
coworker retaliation has continued and even increased in the
workplace. The growing number of retaliatory actions by coworkers
lead to a reasonable conclusion that stronger remedial measures should
be adopted, such as all federal courts applying a broad negligence
standard for coworker retaliation to properly implement the purposes
behind the applicable statutory protections.
4. A Narrow Standard Discourages Proper Employer Supervision
The Fifth Circuit's coworker retaliation standard, and even the
intermediate standard applied by other federal courts, may
unintentionally discourage employers from being active supervisors.
These standards incentivize employers to be ignorant of what occurs in
their places of business. Before the implementation of these standards
employers may have monitored the workplace to ensure employee
safety and collegiality, while now employers may choose to be
uninformed of workplace activities in attempts to avoid liability in a
potential Title VII suit. A lack of appropriate supervision of workplace
activities could lead to increased rates of physical violence between
employees and increased damage to both employer and employee
property.
5. Proactive Responses to Coworker Relationships Actually Benefits
Employers
Those concerned with the potential increase of employer liability
126. Joe Mont, Whistleblower Retaliation Study Finds Co-Workers Part of the Problem,
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.complianceweek.com/whistleblower-retaliation-studyfinds-co-workers-part-of-the-problem/article/264174/.
127. Id. While the ERC and NAVEX Global studies did not compile their findings based on
retaliation solely for Title VII claims, they do show coworkers can, and do, retaliate against their
peers. The studies also reveal that retaliation by coworkers, not just supervisors, is significant to
employees.
128. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: InvigoratingIncentives for Sarbanes-Oxley
Corporateand Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REv. 91, 121 (2007).
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may fear that a negligence standard would impose a heavy burden
against employers, without providing a substantial benefit to
employees. Opponents may reference potential harms such as the
inefficient use of the employer's resources if management increased
monitoring of employees' workplace conduct. These concerns can be
dismissed under the premise that, in actuality, employers who are more
cognizant of coworker retaliation and take an affirmative stance
against such retaliation can personally benefit. The harmful and farreaching effects of coworker retaliation support the view that
employers should make coworker retaliation prevention and correction
a part of their business practices.
Generally, coworker retaliation may decrease the overall success of
a company. 129 Retaliatory actions can stifle even substantial claims of
harassment and improper behavior.
In turn, this can diminish
workplace morale and result in lower productivity and disinterest from
employees.130 Coworker retaliation may also hinder the ability of
employees to effectively and efficiently perform their assigned tasks
due to interdependency of the particular assignment.131
Coworker retaliation can even have a harmful effect on parties who
are not directly involved in the retaliatory acts. For example,
employees who experience retaliation have reported having less
confidence in company executives and having less trust that executives
are honest about the well-being of the company.' 32 Retaliation has
even caused victimized employees to report feeling less optimistic
about the company's financial future. 3 3
Therefore, the entire
hierarchy of the employer's business can be viewed negatively even
after low-level coworker retaliation.
Some may argue that employees who experience coworker
retaliation will inevitably quit their position and any issues related to
coworker retaliation will end upon the victimized employees'
departure. However, employers may still confront extensive internal
and external problems stemming from the coworker retaliation even in
these situations.
Departing employees can impact businesses
129. "The quality and effectiveness of coworker relationships has important implications for the
quality and effectiveness of employees' experiences and the organization as a whole." PATRICIA M.
SIAS, ORGANIZING RELATIONSHIPS: TRADITIONAL AND EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON WORKPLACE
RELATIONSHIPS 57 (2009).

130. KIPLING, supra note 86, at 198.
131. Id.
132. Retaliation: The Cost to Your Company and Its Employees, ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER,
2010, at 12. This study surveyed retaliation generally, not solely in the scope of Title VII or coworker
retaliation.
133. Id. These types of beliefs can cause the employees to be less productive, less interested in
their work, and cause current employees to search for alternative employment.
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internally, as employers must rehire replacement employees. Rehiring
requires the employer to use its resources to recruit qualified
individuals. Then, employers must devote their resources to interview
applicants and train any new hires. Alternatively, if employers choose
not to hire replacement employees and consumer demand remains
constant, employers must somehow adjust their business plans to
maintain necessary production levels.
In addition, departing
employees can negatively affect employers externally by discussing
instances of coworker retaliation and inaction by the employers with
third parties, thus damaging the employers' reputations. A lower
reputation in the market can decrease the employers' applicant pools
and may even harm relationships with consumers.
V. CONCLUSION

Current responses to coworker relation have failed to properly
remedy and deter coworkers from taking matters into their own hands
once employees assert Title VII protections. Both employers and the
government can make changes to prevent coworker retaliation and to
adequately address retaliation when it does occur. In regards to
employers, they should train all levels of employees on the basic
elements of applicable workplace laws and regulations so that all
employees can learn the vast implications of their behavior.
Employers should also increase employee monitoring when necessary
and feasible. Next, employers must provide adequate avenues for
employees who report complaints, thus ensuring that employees feel
comfortable bringing such issues to light. Finally, employers must also
be cognizant of the most effective way to remedy complaints in their
particular business, so that these remedies can be applied consistently
and swiftly.
In regards to the government, the proper approach to coworker
retaliation is twofold, involving both the administrative and judicial
branches. First, administrative agencies that address employmentrelated issues should strongly advise, and incentivize, employers to
adopt business practices that encourage employees to report workplace
misconduct.
Second, all federal courts should adopt a broad
negligence standard to determine when employers are liable for
retaliatory actions by coworkers.
Although combatting coworker retaliation will require active
changes from many parties, including employers, employees, and the
government, these changes are necessary to safeguard Title VII's true
purpose.
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